To study how financial development depends on trade openness and different types of institutions, we present a political economy model in which the elite can repress the financial market at some cost. The elite can persuade the government to set an interest rate ceiling, and it can then channel all capital supplied toward itself. It can thereby keep its capital costs low and limit the domestic production of modern goods by ensuring that ordinary citizens cannot get sufficient capital to produce these goods. The latter raises the prices of modern goods under autarky, but not under free trade. For most world market prices, greater trade openness therefore reduces the elite's incentive to repress the financial market and increases financial development. Better property rights institutions make financial repression more costly for the elite and tend therefore to increase financial development. Better contracting institutions lower the costs of financial transactions, which has countervailing effects on equilibrium financial development. These predictions are consistent with the empirical evidence.
Introduction
Many countries remain financially underdeveloped even though financial development seems to matter for economic growth (Levine, 2005) . The question therefore arises why efficient financial markets develop in some countries, but not in others. There are two main strands in the current literature addressing this question. The first focuses on the role of institutions and goes back to the seminal contributions of La Porta et al. (1997 Porta et al. ( , 1998 ) on how legal systems affect financial development. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have recently estimated the effects of different types of institutions on financial (and economic) development using an instrumental variables approach.
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They find that property rights institutions, which regulate the relationship between ordinary citizens and those in power, have a strong positive effect on financial development, while contracting institutions, which regulate transactions among private citizens, have no effect on banking sector development and at best a weak effect on stock market development. In this paper, we provide a theoretical model with a political economy perspective that allows us to analyze the effects of property rights institutions, contracting institutions and trade openness on financial development. In this model, each agent can produce either traditional or modern goods, but the production of modern goods requires an investment that exceeds an individual agent's capital endowment. 4 Hence, agents can only produce modern goods if they borrow sufficient capital. There is however a powerful elite that can persuade the government to repress the financial market for its own benefit.
In particular, it can ask the government to set an interest rate ceiling and to channel all capital supplied toward its members. Financial repression therefore allows elite members to produce modern goods with low capital costs and to exclude ordinary agents from producing these goods. As a side effect financial repression leads to low financial depth and poor financial development. But sustaining financial repression is costly for the elite; and the repression costs increase in the institutional constraints on the elite and "its" government, i.e., in the quality of the property rights institutions. Under any financial market regime, it is moreover costly for capital lenders to ensure that borrowers repay their debt and their interest. These transaction costs decrease in the quality of the contracting institutions, which facilitate and ensure contract enforcement. We solve the model for the cases of both autarky and free trade.
We show that financial repression is more attractive for the elite under autarky than under free trade unless the world market price of modern goods is very high. The reason is that financial repression only serves to keep capital costs low under free trade, while it has the added advantage under autarky that it raises the price of modern goods by limiting their supply. Should the financial market be liberalized nevertheless, financial development is higher under free trade than under autarky if and only if the world market price of modern goods remains above the resulting autarky price of these goods. Trade openness thus increases equilibrium financial development if world market and autarky prices are roughly similar (in a clearly defined manner), but not necessarily otherwise.
Better property rights institutions tend to increase equilibrium financial development because they make financial repression more costly and therefore less attractive for the elite. The effect of contracting institutions is, however, ambiguous: Better contracting institutions and reduced transaction costs make the financial market more efficient.
Lower transaction costs therefore make, on the one hand, financial repression more attractive for the elite and financial liberalization therefore less likely, In countries like Great Britain and the United States, financial repression is no longer common. According to our model, this could be due to the improvement in these countries' property rights institutions, which came, among others, in the form of extensions 5 Lower transaction costs make financial repression more attractive because the elite can reap the full benefit of reduced transaction costs under financial repression, while this benefit is shared among all the agents in a liberalized financial market. 6 Acemoglu and Johnson (2005, p. 988) call their own explanation of these different effects a "conjecture", and they conclude that more research is needed to understand these effects.
of the political franchise, or due these countries' increased trade openness. In many developing countries and emerging markets, financial repression has however been common until recently or even until today. In his seminal contribution, McKinnon (1973) reports that repressive policies that often include interest rate ceilings and credit "allocations [...] contingent on political and "establishment" connections" (McKinnon, 1973, p. 73 ) are pursued in many countries around the globe. While financial repression has presumably been introduced for developmental purposes in some of these countries, powerful and politically well-connected groups may even in such countries hijack repressive policies for their own benefit. A case in point is South Korea, which is generally considered to be one of the interventionist countries with the soundest economic management. Even there financial repression led to a credit allocation that favored politically well-connected groups in the 1970s (Cho, 1988 (Cho, , 1989 and in the 1990s before the Asian financial crisis (Borensztein and Lee, 2002) . In a similar vein, the capital controls introduced in Malaysia during this crisis also benefitted politically connected firms (Johnson and Mitton, 2003) .
While our paper builds on the contributions of Rajan and Zingales (2003) , and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , our approach differs in two main respects: First, we analyze the effects of trade openness, property rights institutions and contracting institutions within a single unified framework. Second, we present a formal theoretical model. This provides us with the opportunity to be more explicit about the roles that the different institutions play in the economy and about the means that the elite employs to repress the financial market. More importantly, it allows us to obtain new results. As mentioned before, we present the first (formal) explanation for the different effects of property rights and contracting institutions on financial development. Moreover, we get more nuanced results on the interplay between trade openness and financial development than those available in the existing literature, e.g., with respect to the role of the world market prices.
Our paper also relates to some mainly theoretical contributions. Aizenman (2007) and Do and Levchenko (2007) 
The Model
There is a small economy populated by a measure-one continuum of agents. A small group of γ agents constitutes the elite; the remaining 1 − γ agents are ordinary citizens. 
where v(y) is continuous and satisfies v y (y) > 0 and v yy (y) < 0. Besides a market for goods, a capital market 9 may also emerge because agents in the modern sector require more capital than they are endowed with while agents in the traditional sector can produce with less capital than they are endowed with. All agents can in principle borrow or lend capital, but it is costly for lenders to ensure that the borrowers repay their debt and their interest. As discussed by North (1990) , such enforcement and transaction costs lower the potential gains from trade. We thus assume that whenever borrowers face the interest rate r, lenders receive only the net interest rate r − c, where c > 0 denotes the transaction costs necessary to ensure repayment. We abstract from labor inputs. One could, e.g., think that each agent is endowed with one labor unit which is also required to produce x or y. 8 As explained toward the end of this section, we introduce quasi-linear preferences to increase tractability and to simplify comparative static analysis. Notice however that quasi-linear preferences add a certain partial equilibrium flavor to our general equilibrium model. 9 We use the terms "capital market" and "financial market" interchangeably. 10 Results would remain unchanged if lenders had to bear the transaction costs.
These transaction costs decrease when the institutions that mediate between private parties and that facilitate and ensure contract enforcement become more effective, i.e., when the quality of the contracting institutions q c increases. That is, c = c(q c ) with
In a liberalized financial market, denoted by subscript L, the interest rate r L adjusts to equate aggregate demand and supply of capital. The elite members can however persuade the government to repress the financial market for their own advantage. In particular, they can prompt the government to set an interest rate ceiling, which must not be exceeded by the actual interest rate, and they can determine the allocation of the aggregate capital supply in case it falls short of the aggregate capital demand (which will typically be the case).
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Sustaining financial repression is however difficult for the elite for two reasons: First, elite members are only sufficiently powerful to persuade the government to repress the financial market if they speak with a single voice, i.e., if they all agree on a particular repressive policy. Abstracting from enforceable intra-elite side-contracts, we thus assume that financial repression can only take place if it benefits all elite members. Second, ordinary agents will in general oppose financial repression because it benefits the elite at their expense. The elite and "its" government must thus pay the repression costs C > 0 to pass the corresponding financial market regulations, which are solely aimed at their own benefit, and to withstand or suppress the ordinary agents' request for financial liberalization. The repression costs depend on the institutional environment: In particular, they increase when the institutions that constrain the elite and its government and that make them accountable to the society as a whole become more effective, i.e., when the quality of the property rights institutions q p increases. Hence, C = C(q p ) with
We assume that the elite pays the repression costs C if and only if they are lower than its members' aggregate benefits of financial repression. 11 Our model is silent about whether the government implements these repressive policies by running a state bank (and banning private banks and stock markets) or by regulating the private financial sector.
The elite members' potential benefits of financial repression are lower capital costs and higher sales revenues due to a reduction in the aggregate supply of modern goods.
But financial repression can only lead to these benefits if there are fewer elite members than producers of modern goods in a liberalized financial market. We subsequently focus on this case and assume n L > γ, where n L denotes the mass of modern goods producers in a liberalized financial market. Second, agents choose how to behave on the capital market. When it is liberalized, all agents can decide how much capital to borrow or to lend given the market-clearing interest rate r i,L . Under financial repression, the elite members jointly decide what interest rate ceiling to impose and how to allocate the capital supplied. Ordinary agents may not have the possibility of borrowing capital in this case, but they can still decide how much capital to supply. These financial market decisions determine the share of modern goods producer n i,j as well as financial depth d i,j , which equals the amount of capital borrowed or lent, respectively. Following the empirical literature, we interpret 12 If n L ≤ γ, no binding interest rate ceiling could simultaneously benefit all elite members. Hence, there would be no financial repression. 13 Due to the quasi-linear utility function, equivalent and compensating variation coincide. Hence, δ i measures an elite member's willingness to pay to avoid a change from R to L as well as his willingness to pay to induce a change from L to R. financial depth as a proxy for financial development.
14 Third, agents produce either traditional goods or, given that they have sufficient capital, modern goods. Finally, interests are paid, and all agents sell and purchase their goods at either the world market price p T or the domestic market clearing price p A,j , depending on whether or not the economy is open to free trade.
We proceed as follows: In section 3, we derive aggregate demand and supply under both financial market regimes. In section 4, we then derive the elite's aggregate net benefit of financial repression B i to study its choice of financial market regime and equilibrium financial depth d * i under both free trade and autarky. We also discuss how B i and d * i depend on trade openness. This requires deriving the difference between the elite's benefit of financial repression under autarky and free trade, i.e., ∆B ≡ B A − B T .
While characterizing the properties of such differences in welfare differences is hardly possible in general, our relatively simple setting with quasi-linear preferences will allow us to establish interesting comparative static results.
Aggregate demand and supply under different financial market regimes
In this section, we first analyze how agents behave as consumers. We then study how they behave as goods producers and as lenders or borrowers of capital under the different financial market regimes, i.e., after financial liberalization and under financial repression.
14 While in general one may think of "financial depth" and "financial development" as two different concepts, it is standard in the empirical literature to measure financial development by financial depth variables, such as stock market capitalization or credits to the private sector divided by GDP (see, among many others, Beck et al. 
Aggregate demand
The agents' behavior as consumers solely depends on their income m and the relative price of modern goods p; hence, the financial market regime and trade openness affect consumers only through their impacts on m and p. 15 Given m and p, each agent maximizes his utility (1) subject to his budget constraint x + py ≤ m and x, y ≥ 0. Optimization yields each agent's demand
where the concavity of v(y) implies y
For later use, note that the envelope theorem implies
Aggregate demand for modern goods is given by y 
Aggregate supply after financial liberalization
We next analyze how agents behave as goods producers and as lenders or borrowers of capital when the financial market is liberalized. We start by discussing which agents produce which goods, and which producers borrow or lend capital, respectively. Given that there are n L > γ producers of modern goods, all γ elite members produce modern goods since financial transactions are costly and elite members need to borrow less capital for modern goods production than ordinary agents as κ When deciding how capital intensive their production should be and, thereby, how much capital to lend, traditional goods producing ordinary agents maximize their income
measured in units of the traditional good, taking the interest rate r L as given. It follows from the first-order condition f k (k L ) = r L − c that they choose to produce with
capital units. It follows from the concavity of 
Elite members, who all produce modern goods, earn
and modern goods producing ordinary agents earn
When the financial market is liberalized, all agents can choose in which sector to work. In equilibrium it must thus hold that no agent would be better off by switching sector.
17
This requires
such that the two sectors are equally attractive for ordinary agents and that the modern sector is indeed weakly more attractive for elite members.
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Condition (9) implicitly defines the interest rate that prevails in a liberalized financial market as a function of the modern goods price:
Total differentiation of condition (9) and application of the envelope theorem implies
where the inequality follows from k L < K. The intuition is the following: An increase in p L tends to make the modern sector more attractive than the traditional sector; hence, r L must rise to ensure that the two sectors remain equally attractive for ordinary agents.
No producer of traditional goods would ever leave capital unused or lend capital at any interest rate r L ≤ c, while no producer of modern goods would ever borrow more capital than necessary for modern goods production (unless r ≤ 0). The capital allocation k L of the producers of traditional goods therefore directly determines the population share n L of producers of modern goods and, in turn, the aggregate supply of modern and
Notice that there is always domestic production of modern goods since n L > γ, and domestic production of traditional goods since µ κ < K. 18 The latter follows from ∂∆m
such that
with
The share of modern goods producers n L > γ moreover determines the amount of capital borrowed, i.e., financial development
As the focus of this paper is on financial development, we would like to highlight the following result:
Financial development d L increases in the contracting institutions' quality q c because lower transaction costs c raise the financial market's efficiency, and in the sales revenues p L α of modern goods producers because a more attractive capital-intensive sector raises the demand for capital.
Aggregate supply under financial repression
We next focus on the supply side of the economy under financial repression. In particular,
we derive the interest rate ceiling and the capital allocation that the elite members ask the government to impose when they have already decided to repress the financial market.
Any interest rate ceiling weakly higher than r L would have no effect on capital market outcomes. Therefore, whenever the elite makes the costly decision to ask for financial repression, it chooses a binding interest rate ceiling, i.e., a ceiling strictly below r L .
Given a binding interest rate ceiling, such that r R < r L , aggregate capital supply decreases and falls short of aggregate capital demand. This has several effects: First, it decreases the share of modern goods producers and, consequently, the aggregate supply of modern goods. That is, n R < n L and y s R < y s L . Second, agents who borrow capital and produce modern goods become better off, while agents who lend capital and produce traditional goods become worse off unless the price of modern goods were increasing in the supply of these goods. 
decrease in r R . The elite members thus agree that the interest rate ceiling r should be such that the ordinary agents jointly supply exactly
capital units. Knowing equation (5), they therefore set the interest rate ceiling
A lower ceiling would make the aggregate supply of capital falling short of the elite's aggregate capital demand (K − κ e )γ; and a higher ceiling would unnecessarily reduce the elite members' income.
It holds by construction of r that r R = r < r L and n R = γ < n L . Consequently,
Lemma 2 Under financial repression, financial development is
Financial development d R equals the elite's aggregate capital demand γ(K − κ e ) because 19 In our model, the world market price p T is exogenous and therefore independent of y s T , and the autarky price p A will decrease in y 
Equilibrium financial development
In this section, we derive the elite's choice of financial market regime and equilibrium financial development under free trade and autarky. We thereby focus on the effects of property rights and contracting institutions. Moreover, we compare the results under free trade and autarky to analyze the effect of trade openness.
Free trade
We start by looking at the case of free trade, in which the price p T of modern goods is exogenous and, hence, independent of the financial market regime. We first derive the elite members' benefits of financial repression to study their choice of financial market regime. We then discuss the determinants of equilibrium financial development.
Under free trade, all agents face two separate optimization problems: As consumers, they spend their income to maximize their utility (see section 3.1); and as producers and capital owners, they make their capital allocation decisions and, if possible, their sectorial choice so as to maximize their income (see sections 3.2 and 3.3). Elite members further choose the financial market regime that makes them better off; they thereby take all the agents' optimizing behavior under the different financial market regimes as given.
Since this choice does not affect goods prices under free trade, elite members choose the regime that maximizes their income. All results derived in this section are therefore independent of the functional form of the utility function (1).
It follows from our discussion in section 3 that each elite members achieves income 
where the second equality follows from equations (7) and (15). 
Proposition 1 Under free trade, the elite only benefits from financial repression because of lower capital costs (i.e. r T,L > r). Financial repression is the more attractive for the elite (i.e. B T is the higher), the higher p

Autarky
In this section, we focus on the elite's choice of financial market regime and equilibrium financial development under autarky.
The main difference compared to the case of free trade is that goods prices are no longer exogenous, but that they adjust to clear the domestic goods markets. As a consequence, goods prices (can) differ across financial market regimes. (18) and the elite's aggregate net benefit is B A ≡ γδ A − C > 0.
Proposition 3 Under autarky, the elite benefits from financial repression because of lower capital costs (i.e. r < r A,L ) and higher prices of modern goods (i.e. p A,R > p A,L ).
Financial repression is the more attractive for the elite (i.e. B T is the higher), the higher q c and the lower q p . Equation (18) suggests that financial repression has three effects on the welfare of an individual elite member under autarky. The first effect is the same as under free trade:
Financial repression keeps the interest rate down and, therefore, his capital costs low.
The other two effects are new and due to the endogeneity of goods prices under autarky.
There is a positive effect because financial repression keeps prices of modern goods and, thereby, sales revenues high by precluding ordinary agents from producing these goods. Let us again look at equilibrium financial development: 
Free Trade vs Autarky
In this section, we compare the elite's choice of financial market regime and equilibrium financial development under autarky and free trade to analyze how they depend on trade openness.
The difference between the elite's aggregate net benefit of financial repression under autarky and free trade is
where the latter equality follows from equations (17) and (18) . 
Otherwise, the effect of trade openness on equilibrium financial development is ambiguous.
Under financial repression, financial development does not depend on trade openness because the elite simply sets the interest rate ceiling r that induces the ordinary agents to supply the γ(K − κ e ) capital units it demands. Proposition 6 implies that after financial liberalization, financial development is higher under whatever trade regime the prices of modern goods are higher. The reason is that high prices are associated with high free-market interest rates, and that high prices make modern goods production 20 A closer look at the proof of Proposition 5 is helpful to understand why ∆B > 0 for any p T ≤ p A,R . Agents who produce modern goods benefit more from a rise in p A as producers than they loose from such a rise as consumers, at least when Since greater trade openness unambiguously increases financial development for some parameter constellations while its effect is ambiguous for others, our model suggests that when looking at a diverse sample of countries, greater trade openness should on average tend to increase financial development. Nevertheless, the ambiguous effect of trade openness for some parameter constellations suggests that the politico-economic consequences of changes in trade openness on financial development might be less straightforward than the literature has so far acknowledged.
Empirical Evidence
In this section, we argue that our model's predictions about the effects of trade openness, Our model further predicts that higher quality property rights institutions reduce the elite's incentive to repress the financial market and tend therefore to increase equilibrium financial development, but that higher quality contracting institutions have an ambiguous effect on equilibrium financial development. The empirical study by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) , which we discussed in the introduction, estimates the impact of property rights and contracting institutions. They measure property rights and contracting institutions by constraints on the executive and legal formalism, and they use settler mortality and legal origin to instrument for these measures. They find that constraints on the executive have a strong positive effect on financial development in general, while legal formalism has no effect on banking sector development and at best a weak effect on stock market development. The strong effect of property rights institutions is consistent with our predictions, and the non-robust effect of contracting institutions is also not surprising given the ambiguous effect they have in our model. Girma and Shortland (2007) and Huang (2005) provide further evidence that more democratic institutions, which increase the accountability of those in power, increase financial development. In addition, Haber (2005) argues that differences in the institutions responsible for political competition were the major reason for the different evolution of the banking systems in Mexico and the United States from independence to the early 20th century.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a political economy model in which the elite can repress financial development. Greater trade openness and better property rights institutions, which result in more constraints on those in power, tend both to make financial repression less attractive for the elite and thereby to increase financial development. Better A rise in q p has no effect on δ A , but it lowers B A since C qp (q p ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 4:
All results directly follow from Lemmas 1 and 2 and Proportion 3.
Proof of Proposition 5: Inequality (11) and equation (19) imply that ∆B strictly decreases in (11), (12) and (13) imply dm e,y (p, r(p))/dp L ≥ y s (p). Moreover, it holds that ω p (p) A rise in γ decreases p A,R , as shown in Lemma 3, but has no effect on r A,L , r T,L and p A,L .
The proof of Proposition 3 shows that p A,R α + ω(p A,R ) increases in p A,R (as p A,R > p A,L ).
Hence, ∆B must increase in p A,R . It then follows from Lemma 3 that ∆B must decrease in γ.
Consequently, p T decreases in γ as well. 
